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Abstract
A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mech-
anism (or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given so-
lution concept coincides with that speciﬁed by the social choice rule. I adopt
interim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s in-
terim beliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept and
investigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incomplete
information environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditions
under which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doing
so, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation and
Nash implementation.
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: closure, convex range property, implementation, interim equi-
librium, interim incentive compatibility, interim equilibrium monotonicity,
intersection property, no-worst-rule condition, social choice set.
1 Introduction
The theory of implementation or mechanism design attempts to identify the con-
ditions under which a social choice rule may be decentralized through some in-
stitution (or mechanism); that is, when agents, acting on their own self-interest,
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can arrive at the outcomes prescribed by the social choice rule. In contexts in
which the planner knows what agents’ preferences and/or beliefs (henceforth, I
call them types) might be, but does not know what they actually are, the theory
has uncovered necessary and suﬃcient conditions for such decentralization.1
Let me brieﬂy review the previous steps taken by the theory of implemen-
tation for incomplete information environments. A social choice rule is partially
implementable if there exist a mechanism and a Bayesian Nash equilibrium whose
outcome coincides with that speciﬁed by the social choice rule. The celebrated
revelation principle says that whenever partial implementation is possible, one can
always duplicate the same equilibrium outcome by the “truth-telling” equilibrium
in the direct revelation mechanism where each agent announces his own type and
the outcome is determined by the social choice rule itself. Thus, a necessary con-
dition for the implementation of any rule is its incentive compatibility and such a
social choice rule is said to be truthfully implementable. Yet, such an incentive
compatible direct revelation mechanism will typically have additional equilibria,
and these equilibria may be undesirable in the sense of not being consistent with
the original social choice rule. This motivates the question of full (exact) imple-
mentation: the search for mechanisms whose entire set of equilibrium outcomes
coincides with the given rule. In this case of full implementation, another con-
dition – Bayesian monotonicity – emerges, in addition to incentive compatibility.
Bayesian monotonicity is often a demanding requirement and because of this very
reason, the planner is sometimes interested in achieving an approximate version of
exact implementation. This is called virtual implementation, which means that the
planner contents herself with implementing the social choice rule with arbitrarily
high probability. However, the current paper oﬀers no results on virtual implemen-
tation but only compare those known results with this paper’s contribution in the
rest of the paper.
For suﬃciency results of full exact implementation in general incomplete infor-
mation environments, Jackson (1991) shows the following two results when there
are at least three agents: (1) under the economic condition (to be explained later),
a social choice rule satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility, Bayesian monotonicity,
and closure (to be deﬁned in Section 5) if and only if it is implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium; and (2) if a social choice rule satisﬁes interim incentive compati-
bility, closure, and monotonicity-no-veto condition, it is Bayesian implementable.2
Note that closure is always a necessary condition, while monotonicity-no-veto
1For surveys on implementation theory, see, for example, Jackson (2001) and Serrano (2004).
2The reader is referred to Jackson (1991) for the precise deﬁnition of monotonicity-no-veto
condition.
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condition is generally not a necessary condition for implementation. Moreover,
monotonicity-no-veto condition is stronger than a mere combination of Bayesian
monotonicity and no-veto-power condition, which is well known in the literature.3
In the next section below, I will also discuss the contribution of Serrano and Vohra
(2010), who extend the ﬁrst result of Jackson (1991) above to take care of mixed
strategies.
The current paper proposes the concept of interim equilibrium implementation
as full exact implementation in interim equilibrium, which is a generalization of
Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s “interim” beliefs do not necessarily
admit a prior. In particular, the current paper generalizes the results of Jackson
(1991) and Serrano and Vohra (2010) and moreover, identify arguably the weakest
set of conditions for full exact implementation in general incomplete information
environments. The main result of this paper is formally stated as follows:
Theorem: Suppose that there are at least three agents and a given social choice rule
satisﬁes the no-worst-rule condition (NWR). Then, the social choice rule is interim
equilibrium implementable if and only if it satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility,
interim equilibrium monotonicity, and closure.
Here I propose interim equilibrium monotonicity as a generalization of Bayesian
monotonicity where mixed strategies are allowed to play and each agent’s interim
beliefs do not necessarily admit a prior. In Section 2.3 below, I will discuss the
role of the no-worst-rule condition (NWR).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature
review and clariﬁes the scope of the current paper. In Section 3, I introduce the
general notation for the paper. In Section 4, I propose the concept of interim equi-
librium implementation in incomplete information environments. In Section 5, I
identify the necessary conditions for interim equilibrium implementation. In Sec-
tion 6, I provide the suﬃcient conditions for interim equilibrium implementation
when there are at least three agents. In Section 7, I extend the previous suﬃciency
result to the case of two agents. In Section 8, I provide the suﬃciency result for
the case of social choice functions. In Section 9, I restrict attention to complete in-
formation environments and obtain the suﬃciency result for Nash implementation.
Section 10 concludes.
3See Section 9 for the deﬁnition of no-veto-power condition.
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2 Related Literature and the Scope of the Paper
The current paper contributes to unifying the literature of the so-called Bayesian
implementation and Nash implementation. In what follows, I will be clear about
all the aspects of the generalizations the current paper proposes. However, those
who are mainly interested in the main result of this paper can skip Section 2 below
and immediately move on to Section 3 in their ﬁrst reading.
2.1 Type Space
The correct design of institution can be decisive for achieving desirable economic
goals and achieving such a correct design depends on the knowledge of key pa-
rameters in the environment. In the rest of this subsection, I denote the set of
parameters by Θ with a generic element θ. The current paper is concerned with
the situations where not only the planner does not know θ, but the same is true for
the agents in the system. These are called incomplete information environments.
In such environments, an agent’s private information is summarized by the notion
of a type. For an agent, a type speciﬁes (i) his ﬁrst-order belief over Θ, (ii) his
second-order belief over Θ and other agents’ ﬁrst-order beliefs, (iii) his third-order
belief over Θ and other agents’ second-order beliefs, and so on, leading to an inﬁnite
hierarchy of beliefs.
Assuming that Θ is a Polish space, Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) show that
one can construct a type space that consists of all coherent belief hierarchies on
Θ and this type space can be the universal type space in the sense that every
type space can be considered a subspace of the universal type space in a belief
preserving way.4 Moreover, the constructed universal type space is also a Polish
space. Since this paper’s type space is assumed to be Polish, it can be interpreted
as the universal type space. In this sense, the current paper’s type space is quite
general. Duggan (1997) and Serrano and Vohra (2010) consider an even more
general type space without imposing any topological structures on itself. I stress
that this paper’s topological assumption on types (i.e., the type space is Polish) is
not needed at all for all the necessity results (Section 5) but it is important for the
suﬃciency results (Sections 6 through 9).
Finally, I will brieﬂy mention the role of the “common knowledge” assumption
in the theory of implementation. A basic assumption of the standard approach to
implementation theory is that the underlying spaces of types is common knowledge
among the planner and the agents. This common knowledge assumption is often
4A Polish space is a separable, completely metrizable topological space.
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seen as unrealistic so that one seeks for robust implementation, which requires that
implementation survive any speciﬁcation of higher-order beliefs consistent with
the common knowledge structure of the environment. However, the current paper
oﬀers no results on robust implementation but only compare those known results
with this paper’s contribution in the rest of the paper.
2.2 Multi-Valued Social Choice Rules
In the literature of social choice theory and implementation theory, many re-
searchers focus on single-valued social choice rules, i.e., social choice functions
because its analysis then becomes tractable. However, the restriction to social
choice functions often turns out to be severe constraints on its implementability.
For example, Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show that any onto, ex post eﬃ-
cient social choice function deﬁned on the domain of all strict preferences over a
ﬁnite set of alternatives is dictatorial if it satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity – a nec-
essary condition for Nash implementation.5 Saijo (1987) also shows that in the
universal domain of preferences including all agents’ being indiﬀerent over all al-
ternatives, only “constant” social choice functions satisfy Maskin monotonicity.
Therefore, in order to obtain more permissive implementation results, the litera-
ture found it worthwhile to consider multi-valued social choice rules, i.e., social
choice correspondences.6 In fact, many interesting social choice correspondences
satisfy Maskin monotonicity: the Pareto, Core, Walrasian, Envy-Free, Lindhal,
all these correspondences satisfy it. On the other hand, any social choice “func-
tion” selected from these social choice correspondences no longer satisﬁes Maskin
monotonicity. I next turn to Bayesian monotonicity. Although social choice corre-
spondences are more likely to satisfy Bayesian monotonicity than functions, there
are some natural social choice correspondences that do not satisfy Bayesian mono-
tonicity. For instance, Chakravorti (1992) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) show
that Bayesian monotonicity is more restrictive than Maskin monotonicity even for
the case of social choice correspondences. Thus, Bayesian monotonicity is a quite
restrictive condition and this is even more so for the case of social choice functions.
To overcome the limitation of focusing on social choice functions and obtain a bet-
ter understanding of implementation results, the current paper handles the case of
social choice correspondences as well as functions.
5Nash implementation can be seen as a special case of interim equilibrium implementation.
See Section 9 for the precise deﬁnition of Nash implementation.
6To be precise, I use the concept of social choice “set.” The diﬀerence between sets and
correspondences is discussed in Section 9. In the rest of the introduction, I do not distinguish
between social choice correspondences and sets.
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2.3 Domain Restrictions
The current paper obtains a characterization of interim equilibrium implementation
in general incomplete information environments. The only property upon which
this paper crucially relies is what I call “the no-worst-rule” condition (NWR), an
incomplete information analogue of the conditional-no-total-indiﬀerence condition
proposed by Bergemann and Morris (2011). NWR requires that the social choice
rule to be implemented never be the worst social choice rule to any agent of any
type, provided that all other agents’ types are truthfully elicited. In addition, NWR
requires that for each agent of each type and any belief about how other agents
announce their types in the direct revelation mechanism, his interim preferences ex-
hibit diﬀerences over the class of social choice rules that are at least as worse as the
given social choice rule that is truthfully implemented. Note that NWR is stronger
than the no-total-indiﬀerence condition used by Serrano and Vohra (2010). On the
other hand, Serrano and Vohra (2010) need Jackson’s (1991) economic condition,
which says that for “any” given social choice rule and “any” state, there are at least
two agents who prefer to alter the social choice rule at that state. It implies that no
two agents can be simultaneously satisﬁed. The economic condition seems natural
in some contexts and especially so when the money or some special good can be
used as a means of transfer of utilities. For example, Matsushima (1993) explic-
itly assume that side payments are available for Bayesian implementation; Abreu
and Matsushima (1992) need an assumption that plays essentially the same role
of small side payments for virtual implementation; and Artemov, Kunimoto, and
Serrano (2013) and Bergemann and Morris (2009) also need a similar assumption
of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) for robust virtual implementation. Therefore, I
ﬁnd it desirable to clarify how essential this economic condition or the possibility
of side payments is for its implementability. To do so, I simply drop the economic
condition and the existence of money-like commodity all together and seek for the
conditions for implementation in general environments. Theorems 1 and 2 of the
current paper show that one can do away with the economic condition but rather
need a version of no-total-indiﬀerence condition, i.e., NWR for interim equilibrium
implementation. The reader is referred to Section 6 for the argument of how weak
NWR is.
2.4 Mechanisms
While many classical papers only deal with “deterministic” mechanisms, there are
also papers that consider “stochastic” mechanisms. Note that the range space
of stochastic social choice functions is the set of lotteries. For instance, I refer
the reader to the following papers: Matsushima (1993) for Bayesian implementa-
tion; Bergemann, Morris and Tercieux (2011) for implementation in rationalizable
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strategies; Bergemann and Morris (2011) for robust exact implementation; and
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013) and Bergemann and Morris (2009) for
robust virtual implementation. All these authors use stochastic mechanisms in a
fundamental way and the current paper also exploits the “stochastic” nature of
outcomes (i.e., lotteries) when constructing the mechanisms. One obvious beneﬁt
of utilizing stochastic mechanisms is that one can close the gap between the neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions for implementability, as the gap is typically big in the
literature. Of course, this generalization comes at some cost for implementation
because the results may not be robust to the relaxation of the expected utility
hypothesis. See Jackson (2001, Section 4) for this argument. Therefore, this paper
crucially relies on the hypothesis that all agents are expected utility maximizers.
The current paper also exploits the nature of inﬁnite mechanisms in the sense
that the set of messages each agent can announce in the mechanism is either count-
ably inﬁnite or uncountably inﬁnite. Although the use of inﬁnite mechanisms is
rather typical in the literature, it would be desirable to clarify when “ﬁnite” mech-
anisms suﬃce for implementation under a ﬁnite type space. Here I mention one
such a result in the context of virtual implementation: Abreu and Matsushima
(1992) show that under a ﬁnite type space, a social choice function is virtually
implementable by a ﬁnite mechanism if and only if it satisﬁes interim incentive
compatibility and what they call “measurability.” To obtain this result, they in-
voke two assumptions, one of which is a weaker version of NWR (what they call
Assumption 1) and the other condition (what they call Assumption 2), which es-
sentially postulates the use of small side payments. Assumption 2 is by no means
innocuous and can be a strong assumption. Indeed, Kunimoto and Serrano (2011)
show that Assumption 2 cannot be completely dispensed with for exact imple-
mentation in rationalizable strategies by a ﬁnite mechanism. On the contrary, the
current paper does not rely on Assumption 2 or anything similar. So, the cost of
obtaining permissive implementation results is its dependence on the use of inﬁnite
mechanisms. This exhibits a clear trade-oﬀ between the use of inﬁnite mechanisms
and some domain restrictions, such as Assumption 2 of Abreu and Matsushima
(1992).
2.5 Mixed Strategy
Until recently, the literature on implementation with incomplete information has
often left out the consideration of mixed strategy equilibria. This is particularly
problematic for a research program that attempts to address the problem of mul-
tiplicity of equilibria in mechanisms. In fact, Jackson (1991) only considers “pure”
strategies, so do many other papers on Bayesian implementation. See, for ex-
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ample, Postlewaite and Schmeideter (1986), Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990)
and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987, 1989). In contrast, Serrano and Vohra (2010)
consider the issue of mixed strategy equilibria seriously and obtain a character-
ization of mixed strategy Bayesian implementation. There are also other papers
that accommodate mixed strategies. Maskin (1999) deals with mixed strategies for
Nash implementation. In a ﬁnite type space with some domain restrictions (see
Subsection 1.3 for this), Abreu and Matsushima (1992) show that mixed strategies
can be dealt with for virtual implementation. Considering a very general type
space, Duggan (1997) appeals to the argument of puriﬁcation of any mixed strat-
egy equilibrium in the context of virtual implementation.7 Similarly, in the con-
text of robust implementation, Bergemann and Morris (2009, 2011) and Artemov,
Kunimoto and Serrano (2013) argue that the diﬀerence between pure and mixed
strategies goes away because one can construct a suﬃciently large type space and
perform a puriﬁcation of any mixed strategy equilibrium.
2.6 Complete Information or Not
Historically, the literature of implementation theory pays special attention to com-
plete information environments in which the underlying state is always commonly
certain among all the agents. Although this class of environments is natural in
some contexts, it is easy to imagine the situations where the agents are asymmet-
rically informed of the underlying state. The current paper deals with incomplete
information environments and treats complete information ones as a special case
of the former. This uniﬁed treatment is rather special because the implementation
literature often treats these two environments in sperate papers. From this uniﬁed
perspective, I show that the same canonical mechanism for the case of incomplete
information environments can be used for the case of complete information. This
clariﬁes the real diﬀerence of implementability between complete and incomplete
information environments. That is, moving from complete to incomplete informa-
tion environments, one can weaken interim equilibrium monotonicity and NWR
into Maskin monotonicity and the no-worst-alternative (NWA) condition (to be
deﬁned in Section 9), respectively.
7A mixed strategy equilibrium is purified if there exist a sequence of Bayesian games and a
sequence of pure strategy equilibria such that the mixed strategy equilibrium is close to the limit
of the associated sequence of pure strategy equilibria. See, for example, Harsanyi (1973) for the
details.
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3 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the ﬁnite set of agents and Ti be the set of types of agent
i. Throughout the paper, I assume that Ti is a Polish space associated with its Borel
σ-algebra Ti. Denote T ≡ T1×· · ·×Tn, and T−i ≡ T1×· · ·×Ti−1×Ti+1×· · ·×Tn.8 I
endow T−i and T with the product Borel σ-algebras T−i and T , respectively.9 Note
that T−i and T are also Polish spaces. Let Δ(T−i) denote the set of probability
distributions on measurable space (T−i,T−i). Note that Δ(T−i) is also a Polish
space. Each agent i has a system of “interim” beliefs that is expressed as a Ti-
measurable function πi : Ti → Δ(T−i). Then, I call (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N a type space.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be independent of
the information state, associated with its σ-algebra A . Let Δ(A) be the set of
probability distributions over measurable space (A,A ). Agent i’s state dependent
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : Δ(A)×T → R. I assume
that each agent i’s utility function ui(·) is a A × T -measurable function. I can
now deﬁne an environment as E = (A,A , {ui, Ti,Ti, πi}i∈N), which is implicitly
understood to be common knowledge among the agents.
An event E = E1×· · ·×En ∈ T is said to be belief-closed if, for each i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ei, we have πi[ti](E−i) = 1. In words, if an event E is a belief-closed subspace,
it is commonly certain among all agents that E obtains. I stress that type space
(Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N this paper considers can be quite general so that one can interpret
it as the universal type space on some Polish parameter space. The universal type
space consists of the set of all coherent belief hierarchies on a given parameter
space and it is a type space that contains “every” type space as a belief-closed
subspace in itself. The reader is referred to Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) for
more details on the construction of the universal type space. Throughout this
paper I assume that the planner (or mechanism designer) only cares about the
subset of the type space (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i ) where T
∗
i ⊆ Ti, T ∗i is its relative σ-algebra,
and π∗i is the restriction of πi to (T
∗,T ∗) for every i ∈ N . This paper takes
(T ∗,T ∗) as an arbitrarily belief-closed subspace of (T,T ). For example, Jackson
(1991) assumes that all agents have a common support prior over T . Then, T ∗ is
interpreted as the set of proﬁles of types to which agents assign strictly positive
probability. So, this paper can take care of Jackson’s setup as a special case. As in
the case of complete information settings, for example, T ∗ may be a proper subset
of T . I discuss this case in Section 8.
8Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
9If Ti is countable, the natural σ-algebra is discrete, i.e., the one containing all subsets of Ti.
In this case, the σ-algebra Ti is always well-deﬁned. The same comment applies to the product
σ-algebras, T−i and T .
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A (stochastic) social choice function (SCF) is a T -measurable function f :
T → Δ(A). Let F be the set of all SCFs associated with its σ-algebra F . A social
choice set (SCS) F is a nonempty subset of F. I say that two SCSs F and H are
equivalent (F ≈ H) if there exists a bijection π : F → H such that for every f ∈ F
and every h ∈ H satisfying h = π(f), f(t) = h(t) for all t ∈ T ∗. This means that
the two SCSs “coincide” for every t ∈ T ∗. The interim expected utility of agent i
of type ti that pretends to be of type t
′
i corresponding to an SCF f is deﬁned as:
Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti) ≡
∫
T−i
ui(f(t
′
i, t−i)); (ti, t−i))πi[ti](dt−i).
Denote Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; ti|ti).
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi,Mi)i∈N , g) describes a nonempty mes-
sage space Mi for each agent i, equipped with a σ-algebraMi and anM -measurable
outcome function g : M → Δ(A), where M = ×i∈NMi is associated with product
σ-algebra M .10 Let ΓDR = ((Ti,Ti), f) denote the direct revelation mechanism
associated with an SCF f .
4 Interim Equilibrium Implementation
Given a mechanism Γ = (M,M , g), let Γ(T ) denote an incomplete information
game associated with a type space (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N . Let σi : Ti → Δ(Mi) denote a
Ti ×Mi-measurable mixed strategy for agent i and Σi his set of mixed strategies,
where Δ(Mi) denotes the set of probability measures over (Mi,Mi). Let σi(·|ti) de-
note the probability measure over (Mi,Mi) conditional upon ti. Besides, I denote
by σ(·|t) =∏j∈N σj(·|tj) ∈∏j∈N Δ(Mj) the product measure over (M,M ) condi-
tional upon t. Throughout the paper, I assume that g ◦ σ is a T ×M -measurable
function and g ◦ σ ∈ F for every σ ∈ Σ. I denote the support of σ(·|t) by
supp (σ(·|t)) = {M ∈M | σ(·|t) assigns positve measure on M} .
With abuse of notation, I let
Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|ti)
≡
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
∫
Mi
ui(g(mi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ
′
i(dmi|ti)σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i).
Interim equilibrium is a solution concept this paper adopts.
10If Mi is countable, the natural σ-algebra is discrete, i.e., the one containing all subsets of Mi.
In this case, the σ-algebra Mi is always well-deﬁned. The same comment applies to the product
σ-algebras, M−i and M .
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Deﬁnition 1 (Interim Equilibrium) A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is an interim
equilibrium of the game Γ(T ) if, for each i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, and strategy σ′i ∈ Σi,
Ui(g ◦ σ|ti) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|ti).
Given an incomplete information game Γ(T ), let
IEΓ(T ) =
{
σ ∈ Σ
∣∣∣ Ui(g ◦ σ|ti) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|ti) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti, ∀σ′i ∈ Σi
}
be a collection of strategy proﬁles such that each σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) is an interim equilib-
rium of the game Γ(T ).
In this paper, I take each agent’s “interim beliefs” {πi}i∈N as the primitive of
the model and call the corresponding solution concept interim equilibrium. I need
some preparation to deﬁne the standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 A type space (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N is said to be the one with priors if, for
each i ∈ N , there exists pi ∈ Δ(T ) such that pi(·|ti) = πi[ti] ∈ Δ(T−i) for any ti ∈
Ti where pi(·|ti) is the probability distribution on T−i conditional upon ti. Moreover,
a type space (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N is said to be the one with a common prior if it is the
one with priors such that there exists p ∈ Δ(T ) for which p(·|ti) = pi(·|ti) ∈ Δ(T−i)
for each ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ N .
I am now ready to deﬁne Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3 A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ of the game Γ(T ) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE) if it is an interim equilibrium of the game Γ(T ) where
(Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N is a type space with priors.
When the set of interim equilibrium outcomes is required to exactly coincide
with those picked by the SCS, I speak of interim equilibrium implementation.
Deﬁnition 4 (Interim Equilibrium Implementation) An SCS F is interim
equilibrium implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M,M , g) such
that g ◦ IEΓ(T ) ≈ F . More speciﬁcally, this requirement can be decomposed into
the following two properties: (1) for each f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that
g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for each σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), there exists fˆ ∈ F such that g ◦ σ ≈ fˆ .
Remark: First, when a type space with priors is considered, the corresponding
concept is called mixed Bayesian implementation which is considered by Serrano
and Vohra (2010). Second, while keeping property (2), I change property (1) of
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interim equilibrium implementation into the following: (1
′
) there exists a collection
of strategy proﬁles {σλ}λ∈Λ with each σλ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that for each t ∈ T ∗,
⋃
λ
⋃
m⊆supp (σλ(·|t))
g(m) = F (t).
As often the case in the literature, one typically requires the existence of “pure
strategy” equilibrium that satisﬁes property (1). In this case, this modiﬁed version
(1
′
) is weaker than the original one (1) and indeed, this is what Mezzetti and Renou
consider for their mixed Nash implementation. Third, when formulating robust
implementation, Bergemann and Morris (2011) propose the concept of “interim
implementation.” However, their requirement is much stronger than this paper’s
deﬁnition of implementation. An SCS F is interim implementable “in the sense
of Bergemann and Morris” if there exists a mechanism Γ with the following two
properties: (1
′′
) for each f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that g(m) = f(t)
for each t ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ supp (σ(·|t)) and (2′′) for each σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), t ∈ T ∗,
and m ∈ supp (σ(·|t)), we have g(m) ∈ F (t). Maskin (1999) also use the same
requirement of Bergemann and Morris (2011) to take care of mixed strategies but
he is only concerned with Nash implementation.
5 Necessity for Interim Equilibrium Implemen-
tation
In this section, I discuss some necessary conditions for interim equilibrium imple-
mentation. First, as is now prevalent in the whole literature of economic theory, I
discuss incentive compatibility.
Deﬁnition 5 An SCS F satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility if, for each
f ∈ F, i ∈ N , and ti, t′i ∈ Ti,
Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(f ; t′i|ti).
The proposition below is a result well known for Bayesian implementation. I
simply extend this to the case of interim equilibrium implementation.
Proposition 1 If an SCS F is interim equilibrium implementable, it satisﬁes in-
terim incentive compatibility.
Remark: If I instead adopt (1
′
) of the deﬁnition of interim equilibrium implemen-
tation, I am no longer able to show the necessity of interim incentive compatibility.
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Proof : Assume that F is interim equilibrium implementable by a mechanism
Γ = (M,M , g). Fix f ∈ F . By our hypothesis of implementation, there exists
an interim equilibrium σ such that g(σ(t)) = f(t) for each t ∈ T ∗. Since σ is an
equilibrium, for each i ∈ N and ti ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(g ◦ σ|ti) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|ti) ∀σ
′
i ∈ Σi
Note that the case that agent i of type ti uses σi but pretends to be of a diﬀerent
type t
′
i can be interpreted as using a deviation strategy σ
′
i. Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti.
By the very requirement of implementation, we have that f(t) = g(σ(t)) for each
t ∈ T ∗ and f(t′i, t−i) = g(σ′i(ti), σ−i(t−i)). Thus, we can rewrite the above inequality
as follows:
Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(f ; t′i|ti) ∀t
′
i.
This shows that F satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility.
A deception is a collection β = (βi)i∈N , where each βi : Ti → 2Ti\{∅} is Ti-
measurable. Write β(t) = (β1(t1), . . . , βn(tn)). I say f ◦ β ∈ F if, for all t, t′ ∈ T ∗,
whenever t
′ ∈ β(t), there exists f˜ ∈ F such that f˜(t) = f(t′). Otherwise, I say
f ◦ β /∈ F . I introduce interim equilibrium monotonicity as a generalization of
mixed Bayesian monotonicity proposed by Serrano and Vohra (2010).
Deﬁnition 6 An SCS F satisﬁes interim equilibrium monotonicity if, for
every f ∈ F , every deception β for which f◦β /∈ F , and every collection of {ψk}k∈N
with each Tk-measurable ψk : Tk → Δ(Tk) such that for each k ∈ N and tk ∈ Tk,
ψk(t
′
k|tk) > 0⇔ t
′
k ∈ βk(tk),
there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and T−i-measurable function y∗ : T−i → Δ(A) such that
Ui(y
∗ ◦ ψ−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ ψ|ti)
where ψ−i =
∏
j =i ψj : T−i →
∏
j =i Δ(Tk) is a T−i-measurable function and for all
t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
The next proposition shows that interim equilibrium monotonicity is a neces-
sary condition for interim equilibrium implementation.
Proposition 2 If an SCS F is interim equilibrium implementable, then it satisﬁes
interim equilibrium monotonicity.
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Proof : Let Γ = (M,M , g) be a mechanism that interim equilibrium imple-
ments the SCS F . Fix f ∈ F . Let σ be an interim equilibrium such that f ≈ g ◦σ.
Suppose that there exists a deception β such that f ◦ β /∈ F . Assume further that
there exists a collection of {ψk}k∈N with each Tk-measurable ψk : Tk → Δ(Tk)
such that for each k ∈ N and each tk ∈ Tk,
ψk(t
′
k|tk) > 0⇔ t
′
k ∈ βk(tk).
By the requirement of interim equilibrium implementation, it must be that σ ◦ψ is
“not” an interim equilibrium of the game Γ(T ). That is, there exist tˆ ∈ T ∗, i ∈ N
and mˆi ∈ Mi such that
Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i) ◦ ψ−i|ti) > Ui(g ◦ σ ◦ ψ|ti).
Deﬁne y∗ : T−i → Δ(A) as a T−i-measurable function with the following prop-
erty: for any t
′
−i ∈ T−i,
y∗(t
′
−i) =
∫
M−i
g(mˆi, m−i)σ−i(dm−i|t′−i).
Then, by the deﬁnition of implementation (g ◦ σ ≈ f), the previous inequality can
be written as:
Ui(y ◦ ψ−i|tˆi) > Ui(f ◦ ψ|tˆi).
On the other hand, since σ is an equilibrium, we must have the following: for
any t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(g ◦ σ|t˜i) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|t˜i).
By the very construction of y∗ and the requirement of interim equilibrium imple-
mentation (g ◦ σ ≈ f), we rewrite the above inequality:
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
Hence, interim equilibrium monotonicity holds.
β is called a single-valued deception if it is a deception and βi : Ti → Ti for each
i ∈ N . If only single-valued deceptions are considered in the deﬁnition of interim
equilibrium monotonicity, I call the corresponding concept single-valued interim
equilibrium monotonicity.
14
Deﬁnition 7 An SCS F satisﬁes single-valued interim equilibrium mono-
tonicity if, for every f ∈ F and every single-valued deception β for which f ◦ β /∈
F , there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and T−i-measurable function y∗ : T−i → Δ(A) such
that
Ui(y
∗ ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti),
where β−i =
∏
j =i βj and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
To make the connection between the usual interim equilibrium monotonicity
and single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity, I introduce the following con-
dition on SCSs.
Deﬁnition 8 An SCS F satisﬁes the convex range property if, whenever it is
true that for f ∈ F and a collection of single-valued deceptions {βλ}λ∈Λ, one has
that f ◦ βλ ∈ F for each λ ∈ Λ, then it is true that for every (not necessarily
single-valued) deception β˜, if β˜ =
⋃
λ∈Λ β
λ, then one has that f ◦ β˜ ∈ F .
Remark: This property is proposed by Serrano and Vohra (2010). It is easy to
see that every “SCF” trivially satisﬁes this property.
The next result shows an equivalence between the usual interim equilibrium
monotonicity and “single-valued” interim equilibrium monotonicity, provided that
the SCS satisﬁes the convex range property and interim incentive compatibility.
Proposition 3 Suppose that an SCS F satisﬁes the convex range property and
interim incentive compatibility. Then, F satisﬁes interim equilibrium monotonicity
if and only if it satisﬁes single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity.
Remark: Serrano and Vohra (2010) show in their Example 1 that the convex range
property is indispensable for this result. Moreover, Serrano and Vohra (2010) also
show the same result by their Proposition 1 but they do not assume interim in-
centive compatibility. What I found here is that the argument of Proposition 1
of Serrano and Vohra (2010) does not go through without incentive compatibil-
ity. Nevertheless, I do not ﬁnd this problematic because incentive compatibility is
always a necessary condition for implementation.
Proof : By deﬁnition, it is clear that interim equilibrium monotonicity implies
single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity.
Now, we shall show the converse. Suppose that F satisﬁes single-valued interim
equilibrium monotonicity. Fix f ∈ F . Consider a “non” single-valued deception β˜
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such that f ◦ β˜ /∈ F and a collection of {ψk}k∈N with each Tk-measurable function
ψk : Tk → Δ(Tk) such that for each k ∈ N and tk ∈ Tk,
ψk(t
′
k|tk) > 0⇔ t
′
k ∈ β˜k(tk).
Since F satisﬁes the convex range property, we can ﬁnd a “single-valued” deception
β0 such that β0(t) ∈ β˜(t) for any t ∈ T and f ◦ β0 /∈ F . Since F satisﬁes “single-
valued” interim equilibrium monotonicity, there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and T−i-
measurable function y0 : T−i → Δ(A) such that
Ui(y
0 ◦ β0−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β0|ti),
and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y0|t˜i).
Recall that we have assumed that there exists a collection of pure deceptions {βλ}
such that β˜ =
⋃
λ β
λ. In particular, we can assume without loss of generality that
{βλ} is non-redundant, i.e., it never be the case that there exist λ, λ′ ∈ Λ with
λ = λ′ such that βλ(t˜) = βλ′ (t˜) for some t˜ ∈ T ∗. For each (t′i, t′−i) ∈ T , deﬁne
y˜(t
′
i, t
′
−i) ≡
{
y0(t
′
−i) if t
′
i = β
0
i (ti) and t
′
−i = β
0
−i(t˜−i) for some t˜−i
f(t
′
i, t
′
−i) otherwise.
For each t
′
−i ∈ T−i, we next deﬁne
y∗(t
′
−i) ≡
∫
Ti
y˜(t
′
i, t
′
−i)ψi(dt
′
i|ti).
Due to the construction of y∗ and single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity
for β0, we obtain the following:
Ui(y
∗ ◦ ψ−i|ti) = Ui(y˜ ◦ ψ|ti) > Ui(f ◦ ψ|ti).
Recall that F satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility. Then, once again, due
to the construction of y∗ and single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity for
β0, we obtain the following: for any t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
This shows that interim equilibrium monotonicity holds.
I need some preparation for introducing another condition for SCSs. For a
belief-closed subspace E ∈ T and an SCS F , deﬁne
F (E ) ≡ {α ∈ Δ(A)∣∣ ∃ f ∈ F, ∃t ∈ E s.t. f(t) = α} .
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For two belief-closed subspaces E , E
′ ∈ T and an SCS F , deﬁne
F (E ∪ E ′) ≡
{
(α, α
′
) ∈ Δ(A)×Δ(A)∣∣ ∃f ∈ F, ∃t ∈ E , ∃t′ ∈ E ′ s.t. f(t) = α and f(t′) = α′} .
Deﬁnition 9 An SCS F satisﬁes closure if, for any pair of belief-closed subspaces
E , E
′ ∈ T , we have
F (E ∪ E ′) = F (E )× F (E ′).
In words, closure says that interim equilibria should not depend upon any extra
correlation between two belief-closed subspaces. The next result shows that closure
is a necessary condition for interim equilibrium implementation.
Proposition 4 If an SCS F is interim equilibrium implementable, it satisﬁes clo-
sure.
Remark: Jackson (1991) already shows that closure is a necessary condition for
his Bayesian implementation. As long as one is only concerned with social choice
“functions” instead of “sets,” closure becomes a trivial condition and every SCF
satisﬁes it.
Proof : Suppose that an SCS F is interim equilibrium implementable by a
mechanism Γ = (M,M , g). Let E 1, E 2 be a pair of belief-closed subspaces in T .
By deﬁnition, it is easy to see that
F (E 1 ∪ E 2) ⊆ F (E 1)× F (E 2).
Therefore, it only remains to show
F (E 1 ∪ E 2) ⊇ F (E 1)× F (E 2).
By our hypothesis that F is interim equilibrium implementable, for each λ ∈ {1, 2},
we can deﬁne a strategy proﬁle σλ as an interim equilibrium of the game Γ(E λ)
such that
∫
M
g(m)σλ(dm|t) ∈ F (E λ) for each t ∈ E λ. Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle σ
as follows: for each t ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2,
σ(t) =
{
σ1(t) if t ∈ E 1
σ2(t) if t ∈ E 2.
We claim that σ is an interim equilibrium of the game Γ(E 1 ∪ E 2). Fix i ∈ N
and ti ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2. There is no loss of generality to assume that ti ∈ E 1i . Since E 1
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is a belief-closed subspace, we have that for any σ
′
i ∈ Σi,
Ui(g ◦ σ|ti) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|ti)
⇔
∫
E 1−i∪E 2−i
∫
M
ui(g(m); ti, t−i)σ(dm|ti, t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
≥
∫
E 1−i∪E 2−i
∫
M−i
∫
Mi
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, t−i)σ
′
i(dmi|ti)σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇔
∫
E 1−i
∫
M
ui(g(m); ti, t−i)σ(dm|ti, t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
≥
∫
E 1−i
∫
M−i
∫
Mi
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, t−i)σ
′
i(dmi|ti)σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇔
∫
E 1−i
∫
M
ui(g(m); ti, t−i)σ1(dm|ti, t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
≥
∫
E 1−i
∫
M−i
∫
Mi
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, t−i)σ1−i(dm−i|t−i)σ
′
i(dmi|ti)σ1−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇔ Ui(g ◦ σ1|ti) ≥ Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ1−i)|ti).
Hence, σ is also an interim equilibrium. By our hypothesis that F is interim
equilibrium implementable, we know that
∫
M g(m)σ(dm|t) ∈ F (E 1∪E 2) for every
t ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2.
6 Suﬃciency for Interim Equilibrium Implemen-
tation
For each SCF f ∈ F, deﬁne
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → Δ(A)
∣∣∣∣ yi is T−i-measurable andUi(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
.
The set Yi[f ] is associated with its Borel σ-algebra Yi[f ]. Here I adopt the notation
from Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Using the notation above, I introduce an arguably weak condition on SCSs,
which plays an important role in the suﬃciency results later.
Deﬁnition 10 An SCS F satisﬁes the no-worst-rule condition (NWR) if, for
each f ∈ F , i ∈ N , ti ∈ T ∗i , and ψi ∈ Δ(T−i × T−i), there exist two SCFs
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yi[f ; ti, ψi], y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∫
T−i×T−i
ui(y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i)
>
∫
T−i×T−i
ui(yi[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i).
Remark: By NWR, I require that for any belief that type ti has about the types
of the other agents and how types t−i pretend to be t
′
−i in the direct revelation
mechanism, there be no total indiﬀerence among all SCFs within Yi[f ]. This NWR
is an incomplete information analogue of the conditional-no-total-indiﬀerence con-
dition of Bergemann and Morris (2011) and moreover it is extended so as to take
care of social choice “sets.”
I argue that NWR is a very weak domain restriction because the choice of two
SCFs yi[f ; ti, ψi] and y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi] could depend upon both ti and ψi. Consider an
environment in which a money-like commodity exists and agents have queasilinear
preferences with respect to this commodity. In such environments, the subsidies
or payments of agent i should not aﬀect the utilities of the rest of agents at all.
Such a property is very crucial for obtaining some of the implementation results
in the literature but the current paper does not need the existence of money or
anything similar at all. Indeed, NWR does not care about how any other agent
j = i evaluates these SCFs yi[f ; ti, ψi] and y′i[f ; ti, ψi], which is speciﬁcally designed
for agent i. Hence, the results of the current papers are quite robust to a much
larger class of environments. In addition, Moore and Repullo’s (1990) use the
bad outcome condition for some of their results: It requires that the above NWR
hold uniformly over all agents, all types, and all possible beliefs. Clearly, NWR is
much weaker than this bad outcome condition. I will discuss the role of NWR and
its relation to other assumptions in the literature a little more after the proof of
Theorem 1.
Since Ti is a Polish space, so is Δ(Ti). Therefore, Δ(Ti) has a countable dense
subset and I denote it by Δ∗(Ti). Then, one can ﬁnd a mapping πi : Ti → Δ∗(Ti)
such that πi(ti) is the closest to ti (in terms of the associated topology on Δ(Ti))
for each ti ∈ Ti. For all ti, t′i ∈ Ti, ti and t′i are said to be equivalent (denoted
ti ∼ t′i) if πi(ti) = πi(t′i). I then deﬁne T ∗i = Ti\∼ as the equivalence class on Ti
via ∼. By construction, T ∗i is a countable set and I denote it by T ∗i = {ti}∞=1.
Similarly, one can ﬁnd its countable dense subset of Δ(T−i × T−i) and I denote
it by {ψki }∞k=1. Since F satisﬁes NWR, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N , I deﬁne the
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uniform SCF y¯i[f ] as follows: there exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
2
∞∑
=1
η−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
y
′
i[f ; t

i , ψ
k
i ] + yi[f ; t

i, ψ
k
i ]
}
.
I use this uniform SCF y¯i[f ] in the canonical mechanism I propose later.
I also use the following result later and claim that this is one implication that
comes from NWR.
Lemma 1 Suppose that an SCS F satisﬁes NWR. Then, for all i ∈ N , ti ∈ T ∗i ,
and φi ∈ Δ(T−i), there exist two lotteries (or constant SCFs) αi[ti, φi], α′i[ti, φi] ∈
Δ(A) such that∫
T−i
ui(α
′
i[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i) >
∫
T−i
ui(αi[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i).
Remark: The property stated in this lemma is stronger than the version of the
no-total-indiﬀerence condition used by Serrano and Vohra (2005, 2010).
Proof : Fix i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and φi, φ˜i ∈ Δ(T−i). Fix f ∈ F as well. We choose
the constant γ so that
γ
∫
T−i×T−i
φ˜i(dt
′
−i)φi(dt−i) = 1.
For each T−i, T ′−i ∈ T−i, deﬁne
ψi(T ′−i, T−i) = γφ˜i(T
′
−i)φi(T−i).
Since F satisﬁes NWR, there exist y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi], yi[f ; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∫
T−i×T−i
ui(y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i)
>
∫
T−i×T−i
ui(yi[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i).
Deﬁne
αi[ti, φi] =
∫
T−i
yi[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i)φ˜i(dt
′
−i) and α
′
i[ti, φi] =
∫
T−i
y
′
i[f ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i)φ˜i(dt
′
−i).
Then, by construction of αi[ti, φi] and α
′
i[ti, φi], we rewrite the above inequality:∫
T−i
ui(α
′
i[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i) >
∫
T−i
ui(αi[ti, φi]; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i).
20
This completes the proof.
Following the previous argument, I use the equivalence class on Ti via ∼ and
denote it by {ti}∞=1 and its countable dense subset of Δ(T−i) by {ψki }∞k=1, respec-
tively. For each i ∈ N , I deﬁne the uniform lottery α¯i ∈ Δ(A) as follows: there
exist δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
α¯i ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
2
∞∑
=1
η−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1
{
α
′
i[t

i , φ
k
i ] + αi[t

i , φ
k
i ]
}
.
Finally, I deﬁne
α¯ ≡ 1
n
∑
i∈N
α¯i.
I use this uniform lottery α¯ in the canonical mechanism I propose below and I am
ready to provide a suﬃciency result for interim equilibrium implementation.
Theorem 1 Suppose there are at least three agents (n ≥ 3). If an SCS F satis-
ﬁes interim incentive compatibility, interim equilibrium monotonicity, closure, and
NWR, then it is interim equilibrium implementable.
Remark: The proof here builds upon the canonical mechanism proposed in Propo-
sition 1 of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Proof : We prove this by constructing an implementing mechanism Γ = (M,M , g).
Each agent i sends a message mi = (m
1
i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i , m
5
i ) where m
1
i ∈ T ∗i , m2i ∈
F, m3i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, m4i = {m4i [f ]}f∈F where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] for each f ∈ F ,
and m5i ∈ Δ(A). Let Mi = Ti × F × 2 ×
∏
f∈F Yi[f ] × 2A be its associated
σ-algebra.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule 1: If there exists f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all j ∈ N , then
g(m) = f(m1).
Rule 2: If there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all
j = i and m3i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m4i [f ](m
1
−i) with probabiltiy m
3
i /(m
3
i + 1)
y¯i[f ](m
1
−i) with probability 1/(m
3
i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform SCF deﬁned previously.
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Rule 3: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m51 with probability m
3
1/n(m
3
1 + 1)
m52 with probability m
3
2/n(m
3
2 + 1)
...
...
m5n with probability m
3
n/n(m
3
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery over A, as deﬁned previously.
The proof consists of a series of claims.
Claim 1: For any interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), m ∈ M , and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp (σ(·|t))⇒ m3j = 1 for each j ∈ N .
Proof of Claim 1: Fix an interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ). We focus on type
ti of agent i who has the following conjecture over M−i × T−i:
πi[ti] ◦ σ−i ∈ Δ(M−i × T−i).
Suppose by way of contradiction that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message mi such
that m3i > 1. We ﬁx such mi and partition the messages of all agents but i as
follows: for each T ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(T
′
−i) =
{
m−i
∣∣ ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all j = i and m1−i ⊆ T ′−i} ,
and
Mˆ−i =
{
m−i
∣∣ m3j > 1 for some j = i} .
If ∫
T−i
∫
Mˆ−i
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i) > 0,
then, we can set
φi(T−i) = γ
∫
T−i
∫
Mˆ−i
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i).
for any T−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
T−i
φi(dt−i) = 1. Since
F satisﬁes NWR, by Lemma 1, we know that there exists mˆ5i ∈ Δ(A) such that∫
T−i
ui(mˆ
5
i ; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i) >
∫
T−i
ui(α¯; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i).
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Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
5
i is replaced by mˆ
5
i deﬁned above
and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇒ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ IEΓ(T ).
For each T ′−i ∈ T−i, if∫
T−i
∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(T ′−i, T−i) ≡ γ
∫
T−i
∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i),
for any T−i, T ′−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
T−i×T−i ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i) =
1. Since F satisﬁes NWR, there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∫
T−i×T−i
ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i) >
∫
T−i×T−i
ui(y¯i[f ](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i).
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
4
i [f ] is replaced by mˆ
4
i [f ] deﬁned
above and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the
following: ∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇒ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ IEΓ(T ).
Claim 2: For any interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), there exists f ∈ F such that
m2j = f for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , and mj ∈ supp (σj(·|tj)).
23
Proof of Claim 2: Fix an interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ). By the previous
claim, we have that for any t ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ supp (σ(·|t)), m3j = 1 for each j ∈ N .
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist t ∈ T ∗ and i ∈ N such that
supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message mi such that m3i = 1 and m2i ≈ m2k for some
k = i. Then, We ﬁx such mi and we only need to consider the two cases:
Case 1: there exist i, j, k ∈ N such that m2i ≈ m2j , m2j ≈ m2k, and m2k ≈ m2i ; or
Case 2: there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f for each j = i
First, we assume Case 1 applies. We focus on agent i of type ti who has the
following conjecture over M−i × T−i:
πi[ti] ◦ σ−i ∈ Δ(M−i × T−i).
We consider the following messages of all agents but i:
Mˆ−i =
{
m−i
∣∣ ∃j, k ∈ N\{i} s.t. m2i ≈ m2j , m2j ≈ m2k, and m2k ≈ m2i} .
If ∫
T−i
∫
Mˆ−i
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i) > 0,
then, we can set
φi(T−i) ≡ γ
∫
T−i
∫
Mˆ−i
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i),
for any T−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
T−i
φi(dt−i) = 1. Since
F satisﬁes NWR, by Lemma 1, we know that there exists mˆ5i ∈ Δ(A) such that∫
T−i
ui(mˆ
5
i ; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i) >
∫
T−i
ui(α¯; (ti, t−i))φi(dt−i).
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
5
i is replaced by mˆ
5
i deﬁned above
and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇒ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti).
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Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ IEΓ(T ).
Next we assume that Case 2 applies. We focus on agent i of type ti who has
the following conjecture over M−i × T−i:
πi[ti] ◦ σ−i ∈ Δ(M−i × T−i).
We consider the following messages of all agents but i: for each T ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(T
′
−i) =
{
m−i| ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f ∀j = i and m1−i ⊆ T ′−i
}
.
For each T ′−i ∈ T−i, if∫
T−i
∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i) > 0,
then, for any T−i, T ′−i ∈ T−i, we can set
ψi(T ′−i, T−i) ≡ γ
∫
T−i
∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i),
where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
T−i×T−i ψi(dt
′
i, dti) = 1. Since F satisﬁes
NWR, there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∫
T−i×T−i
ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i) >
∫
T−i×T−i
ui(y¯i[f ](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i)
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
4
i [f ] is replaced by mˆ
4
i [f ] and mˆ
3
i =
m3i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇒ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ IEΓ(T ).
Claim 3: For each f ∈ F , there exists an interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such
that for all j ∈ N and tj ∈ Ti:
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)) ⇒ mj = (tj , f, 1, m4j , m5j)
for some m4j ∈ M4j and m5j ∈ M5j .
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Proof of Claim 3: Fix f ∈ F . For each j ∈ N , deﬁne σj : Tj → Mj satisfying
the following properties: for each tj ∈ T ∗j ,
1. σ1j (tj) = tj ∈ M1j ;
2. σ2j (tj) = f ∈ M2j ; and
3. σ3j (tj) = 1 ∈ M3j .
Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. It only remains to show that σi(ti) is a best response
of type ti to σ−i. Observe that m2i or m
5
i are irrelevant for the resulting outcome
given σ−i. If type ti deviates from σi(ti) to some mˆi where m3i > 1, he can induce
Rule 2. Then, there is always positive probability that y¯i[f ] is chosen and since
F satisﬁes NWR, type ti can be worse oﬀ than playing σi(ti). Thus, the only
proﬁtable deviation type ti can possibly have is to change m
1
i but change neither
m2i nor m
3
i . However, since all agents are truthful by our hypothesis and f satisﬁes
interim incentive compatibility, this cannot be proﬁtable. Thus, σi(ti) is a best
response of type ti to σ−i.
Claim 4: For each SCF f ∈ F and deception β, if there exists an interim
equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that for each t ∈ T ∗, m ∈ supp (σ(·|t)), and j ∈ N ,
mj = (t
′
j , f, 1, m
4
j , m
5
j) for some (m
4
i , m
5
i ) and t
′
j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ∈ F .
Proof of Claim 4: Fix an SCF f ∈ F , a deception β, and an interim equilib-
rium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) as deﬁned in the statement of the claim. We argue by contradic-
tion. Suppose f ◦β /∈ F . Then, by interim equilibrium monotonicity, we have that
for every collection of {ψk}k∈N with each Tk-measurable function ψk : Tk → Δ(Tk)
such that for each k ∈ N and tk, t′k ∈ Tk,
ψk(t
′
k|tk) > 0⇔ t
′
k ∈ βk(tk),
there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and T−i-measurable function y∗ : T−i → Δ(A) such
that ∫
T−i
∫
T−i
ui(y
∗(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i))ψ−i(dt
′
−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
T−i
∫
Ti
ui(f(t
′
i, t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
i|ti)ψ−i(dt
′
−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i),
where ψ−i(dt
′
−i|t−i) =
∏
j =i ψj(dt
′
j |tj) and for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,∫
T−i
ui(f(t˜i, t−i); (t˜i, t−i))πi[t˜i](dt−i) ≥
∫
T−i
ui(y
∗(t−i), (t˜i, t−i))πi[t˜i](dt−i).
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For each j ∈ N and T ′j ∈ Tj, deﬁne
Mj(T ′j ) ≡
{
mj ∈ Mj
∣∣∣ m1j ⊆ T ′j
}
,
and for each j ∈ N , tj ∈ Tj, and T ′j ∈ Tj , deﬁne
ψj(T ′j |tj) ≡
∫
Mj(T ′j )
σj(dmj |tj).
In what follows, we focus on agent i of type ti as identiﬁed in the condition of
interim equilibrium monotonicity. Assume by our hypothesis that supp(σi(·|ti))
contains a message mi as such. For each T ′−i ∈ T−i, deﬁne
M−i(T ′−i) =
∏
j =i
Mj(T ′j ).
For each t−i ∈ T−i and T ′−i ∈ T−i, deﬁne
ψ−i(T ′−i|t−i) ≡
∫
M−i(T ′−i)
σ−i(dm−i|t−i).
Then, by interim equilibrium monotonicity, we can set mˆ4i [f ] = y
∗ ∈ Yi[f ] so
that ∫
T−i
∫
T−i
ui(y
∗(t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψ−i(dt
′
−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
T−i
∫
Ti
ui(f(t
′
i, t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
i|ti)ψ−i(dt
′
−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
4
i [f ] is replaced by mˆ
4
i [f ] = y
∗ and
mˆ3i is chosen suﬃciently large. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude
the following:
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
>
∫
T−i
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); (ti, t−i))σ−i(dm−i|t−i)πi[ti](dt−i)
⇒ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σ−i)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σ−i)|ti).
This implies that, given σ−i of the other agents’ equilibrium strategies, mˆi can
increase his payoﬀ by announcing mˆ3i suﬃciently large, choosing mˆ
4
i [f ] = y
∗, and,
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as a result, inducing Rule 2. That is, mˆi is an even better response to σ−i than
mi. This contradicts to our hypothesis that σ ∈ IEΓ(T ).
All four claims we have established above imply that (1) for any f ∈ F , there
exists σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), we have that
g ◦ σ ∈ F . Thus, we complete the proof of the theorem.
Unlike Jackson (1991), Theorem 1 takes care of mixed strategies. Serrano and
Vohra (2010) also dealt with mixed strategies and in so doing, they need to im-
pose two assumptions (the no-total-indiﬀerence condition and Jackson’s (1991)
economic condition) on the environment. Theorem 1 needs to strengthen the ver-
sion of Serrano and Vohra’s (2010) no-total-indiﬀerence condition into NWR but
can completely dispense with the economic condition. Jackson’s economic con-
dition says that for any given SCF and state, there are at least two agents who
prefer to alter the social choice function at that state. Although the economic con-
dition seems natural in some contexts, it is still crucial to know to what extent the
economic condition is essential for obtaining the suﬃciency results. The best way
of doing this is simply abandon the economic condition and seek for implemen-
tation in general environments. In such environments, Jackson (1991) proposes
“Monotonicity-No-Veto” together with interim incentive compatibility and closure
as a suﬃcient (but not necessary!) condition for Bayesian implementation. Since
all the above conditions except NWR are shown to be necessary for implementa-
tion, I argue that this paper proposes the weakest set of suﬃcient conditions for
“mixed strategy” Bayesian (or interim equilibrium) implementation.
7 The Case of Two Agents
In this section, I extend the previous result to the case of two agents. For the case
of two agents, Dutta and Sen (1994) establish the following necessary condition:
for all f 1, f 2 ∈ F with f 1 ≈ f 2, we must have Y1[f 2] ∩ Y2[f 1] = ∅. To obtain
a suﬃciency result, I need to slightly strengthen this necessary condition to the
following condition.
Deﬁnition 11 An SCS F satisﬁes the intersection property if, for each i ∈
{1, 2} = N , f i, f j ∈ F with f i ≈ f j, ti ∈ T ∗i , and ψi ∈ Δ(T−i × T−i), there exist
yi[f
j; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f j] and yi[f i, f j; ti, ψi] ∈ Yi[f j ] ∩ Yj[f i] such that∫
T−i×T−i
ui(yi[f
j ; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i)
>
∫
T−i×T−i
ui(yi[f
i, f j; ti, ψi](t
′
−i); (ti, t−i))ψi(dt
′
−i, dt−i)
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Following the argument in the previous section, I use the equivalence class on Ti
via ∼ and denote it by {ti}∞=1. I denote its countable dense subset of Δ(T−i×T−i)
by {ψki }∞k=1. If an SCS F satisﬁes the intersection property, for all f, f ′ ∈ F with
f ≈ f ′ and each i ∈ {1, 2}, I deﬁne the uniform SCF y¯i[f, f ′] as follows: there exist
δ, η ∈ (0, 1) such that
y¯i[f, f
′
] ≡ (1− δ)(1− η)
∞∑
=1
η−1
∞∑
k=1
δk−1yi[f, f
′
; ti , ψ
k
i ].
Then, I deﬁne
y¯[f, f
′
] =
1
2
y¯1[f, f
′
] +
1
2
y¯2[f, f
′
].
I use the uniform SCF y¯[f, f
′
] in the canonical mechanism I propose below.
Theorem 2 Let N = {1, 2} be the set of agents. If an SCS F satisﬁes interim
incentive compatibility, interim equilibrium monotonicity, closure, NWR and the
intersection property, it is interim equilibrium implementable.
Proof : We prove this by constructing an implementing mechanism Γ = (M,M , g).
Each agent i sends a message mi = (m
1
i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i , m
5
i ) where m
1
i ∈ T ∗i , m2i ∈
F, m3i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, m4i = {m4i [f ]}f∈F where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] for each f ∈ F ,
and m5i ∈ Δ(A). Let Mi = Ti × F × 2 ×
∏
f∈F Yi[f ] × 2A be its associated
σ-algebra.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
Rule I: If there exist f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all j ∈ N , then
g(m) = f(m1).
Rule II: If m3k = 1 for each k ∈ N and there exist f i, f j ∈ F with f i ≈ f j such
that m2i = f
i and m2j = f
j , then g(m) = y¯[f i, f j] where y¯[f i, f j] is the uniform
SCF deﬁned previously.
Rule III: If there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all
j = i and m3i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m4i [f ](m
1
−i) with probabiltiy m
3
i /(m
3
i + 1)
y¯i[f ](m
1
−i) with probability 1/(m
3
i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform SCF deﬁned above.
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Rule IV: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m51 with probability m
3
1/n(m
3
1 + 1)
m52 with probability m
3
2/n(m
3
2 + 1)
...
...
m5n with probability m
3
n/n(m
3
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery over A, as deﬁned previously.
We complete the proof by a series of claims below.
Claim I: For any interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), m ∈ M , and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp(σ(·|t))⇒ m3j = 1 for each j ∈ N .
Proof of Claim I: This is essentially the same as the proof of Claim 1 of
Theorem 1. Hence, we skip the proof.
Claim II: For any interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), there exists f ∈ F such that
m2j = f for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)).
Proof of Claim II: By the previous claim, we know that m3j = 1 for each
j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , and mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)). Suppose by way of contradiction that
there exist t ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ supp(σ(·|t)) such that m2i = f i ≈ f j = m2j . We focus
on agent i of type ti who has the following conjecture over Mj × Tj :
πi[ti] ◦ σj ∈ Δ(Mj × Tj).
We ﬁx such mi and consider the messages of agent j = i as follows: for each
Tj ∈ Tj,
M∗j (T
′
j ) =
{
mj | ∃f j ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f j and m3j = 1 and m1j ⊆ T ′j
}
.
For each T ′j ∈ Tj , if ∫
Tj
∫
M∗j (Tj)
σj(dmj |tj)πi[ti](dtj) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(T ′j , Tj) ≡ γ
∫
Tj
∫
M∗j (Tj)
σj(dmj|tj)πi[ti](dtj)
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for any Tj ∈ Tj where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
Tj×Tj ψi(dt
′
j, dtj) = 1.
Since F satisﬁes the intersection property, there exists mˆ4i [f
j ] ∈ Yi[f j ] such that∫
Tj×Tj
ui(mˆ
4
i [f
j ](t
′
j); ti, tj)ψi(dt
′
j , dtj) >
∫
Tj×Tj
ui(y¯[f
i, f j](t
′
j); ti, tj)ψi(dt
′
j, dtj).
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
4
i [f
j] is replaced by mˆ4i [f
j] deﬁned
above and mˆ3i > 1 suﬃciently large. Then, the above inequality allows us to
conclude the following:
∫
Tj
∫
Mj
ui(g(mˆi, mj); ti, tj)σj(dmj|tj)πi[ti](dtj)
>
∫
Tj
∫
Mj
ui(g(mi, mj); ti, tj)σj(dmj|tj)πi[ti](dtj)
⇒ Ui(g ◦ (mˆi, σj)|ti) > Ui(g ◦ (mi, σj)|ti).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σj than mi. This contradicts to our
hypothesis σ ∈ IEΓ(T ).
Claim III: For each f ∈ F , there exists an interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such
that for all j ∈ N and tj ∈ Tj :
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)) ⇒ mj = (tj , f, 1, m4j , m5j)
for some m4j ∈ M4j and m5j ∈ M5j .
Proof of Claim III: Fix f ∈ F . For each j ∈ N , deﬁne σj : Tj → Mj
satisfying the following properties: for each tj ∈ T ∗j ,
1. σ1j (tj) = tj ∈ M1j ;
2. σ2j (tj) = f ∈ M2j ; and
3. σ3j (tj) = 1 ∈ M3j .
Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. Then, it only remains to show that σi(ti) is a best response
of type ti to σ−i. Observe ﬁrst that m5i is irrelevant for the resulting outcome given
σ−i. Let us denote by mˆi a deviation strategy of type ti. Assume that mˆi has
the property that mˆ2i = 1 and mˆ
2
i = f
′ ≈ f so that it induces Rule II. Then, the
lottery y¯[f
′
, f ] is chosen so that type ti is worse oﬀ with mˆi than σi(ti). Suppose
that mˆi has the property that mˆ
3
i > 1 so that it induces Rule III. Then, there is
always positive probability that y¯i[f ] is chosen so that type ti is worse oﬀ with mˆi
than σi(ti). Therefore, the only proﬁtable deviation type ti can possibly have is
31
to change σ1i (ti) into mˆ
1
i but change neither σ
2
i (ti) nor σ
3
i (ti). However, since the
other agent j = i is truthful by our hypothesis and f satisﬁes interim incentive
compatibility, this cannot be proﬁtable. Thus, σi(ti) is a best response of type ti
to σ−i.
Claim IV: For each f ∈ F and deception β, if there exists an interim equilibrium
σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ Tj, and mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)),
mj = (t
′
j , f, 1, m
4
j , m
5
j) for some (m
4
j , m
5
j ) and t
′
j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ∈ F .
Proof of Claim IV: This is the same as the proof of Claim 4 of Theorem 1.
Hence, we skip the proof.
All four claims we have established above imply that (1) for any f ∈ F , there
exists σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), we have that
g ◦ σ ∈ F . Thus, we complete the proof of the theorem.
8 The Case of Social Choice Functions
In this section, I adapt Theorems 1 and 2 to the case of social choice “functions.”
Most importantly, I can propose a single canonical mechanism that works simul-
taneously for the case of two agents as well as more than two agents.
Theorem 3 If an SCF f satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility, single-valued in-
terim equilibrium monotonicity, and NWR, it is interim equilibrium implementable.
Proof : First, since every SCF satisﬁes closure, we no longer need this condition
in the statement of the theorem. Second, the intersection property is vacuously
satisﬁed for SCFs. Recall also that every SCF satisﬁes the convex range prop-
erty. So, given interim incentive compatibility, by Proposition 3, we can exploit
the equivalence between interim equilibrium monotonicity and single-valued in-
terim equilibrium monotonicity. Thus, in the statement of the theorem, we replace
interim equilibrium monotonicity with its single-valued one. We prove this by
constructing an implementing mechanism Γ = (M,M , g). Each agent i sends a
message mi = (m
1
i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i ) where m
1
i ∈ T ∗i , m2i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, the set of
positive integers, m3i ∈ Yi[f ], and m4i ∈ Δ(A). Let Mi = Ti × 2 × Yi[f ]× 2A be
its associated σ-algebra.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
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Rule A: If m2i = 1 for all i ∈ N , then g(m) = f(m1).
Rule B: If there exist i ∈ N such that m2j = 1 for all j = i and m2i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m3i (m
1
−i) with probabiltiy m
2
i /(m
2
i + 1)
y¯i[f ](m
1
−i) with probability 1/(m
2
i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform SCF deﬁned previously.
Rule C: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m41 with probability m
2
1/n(m
2
1 + 1)
m42 with probability m
2
2/n(m
2
2 + 1)
...
...
m4n with probability m
2
n/n(m
2
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery deﬁned previously.
The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as that Theorem 1 for SCSs.
Like the previous theorem, the proof consists of a series of claims.
Claim A: For any interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), m ∈ M , and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp (σ(·|t))⇒ m2i = 1 for each i ∈ N .
Claim B: There exists an interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that for all i ∈ N
and ti ∈ Ti, σi(·|ti) assigns probability one on mi = (ti, 1, m3i , m4i ) for some
m3i ∈ M3i and m4i ∈ M4i .
Claim C: For each deception β, if there exists an interim equilibrium σ ∈ IEΓ(T )
such that for each t ∈ T ∗, m ∈ supp (σ(·|t)), and j ∈ N ,
mj = (t
′
j, 1, m
3
j , m
4
j ) for some (m
3
j , m
4
j) and t
′
j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ≈ f .
Claim A corresponds to Claim 1; Claim B corresponds to Claim 3; and Claim
C corresponds to Claim 4 in Theorem 1. Hence, we skip all the proofs for Claims
A, B, and C. All three claims we have established above imply that (1) there exists
σ ∈ IEΓ(T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ IEΓ(T ), we have g ◦ σ ≈ f .
Thus, we complete the proof of the theorem.
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9 Nash Implementation
The theory of implementation often focuses on a special class of environments
where it is commonly certain among all the agents that what state is realized.
This is called a complete information environment.
Deﬁnition 12 (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N is said to be a complete information type space
if every t ∈ T is a belief-closed subspace.
Remark: Closure becomes a vacuous condition under a complete information type
space.
In the rest of the section, I assume that belief-closed subspace (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i ) is a
complete information type space in (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N . As is often used in the theory
of implementation under complete information (See Maskin (1999) for example),
I introduce the concept of social choice correspondences (henceforth, SCCs). An
SCC F : T ⇒ Δ(A) is a mapping from T to a subset of Δ(A). It is easy to
see that any SCS F has an equivalent representation in terms of social choice
correspondence: For any SCS F and t ∈ T , I can deﬁne
F(t) = {α ∈ Δ(A)| ∃f ∈ F s.t. f(t) = α} .
Clearly, the resulting mapping F is a social choice correspondence. In this sense,
any social choice set is a social choice correspondence.
Now, I consider the converse. Fix any SCC F : T ⇒ Δ(A). Then, it is not
clear at all how one can ﬁnd an SCS F satisfying closure such that for any t ∈ T ∗,
⋃
f∈F
f(t) = F(t).
Thus, closure potentially becomes a crucial property that makes social choice sets
distinct from social choice correspondences. However, when one is only concerned
with complete information, there is no diﬀerence between social choice sets and
social choice correspondences:
Proposition 5 Let (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N be a complete information type space. Then, for
any SCC F : T ⇒ Δ(A), there exists an SCS F satisfying closure such that for
any t ∈ T ∗,
⋃
f∈F
f(t) = F(t).
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Proof : For any t ∈ T ∗, let Λ[t] be an index set such that for any λ ∈ Λ[t],
αλ ∈ F(t) and
⋃
λ∈Λ[t]
αλ = F(t).
Deﬁne an SCS F as follows:
F = {f | ∃t ∈ T ∗, ∃λ ∈ Λ[t] s.t. f(t) = αλ}
Since every t ∈ T ∗ is a belief-closed subspace, the constructed F automatically
satisﬁes closure. In addition, by construction of F , we have that for any t ∈ T ∗,
⋃
f∈F
f(t) = F(t).
This completes the proof.
A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(T ) if, for every
i ∈ N, t ∈ T, and σ′i ∈ Σi,
ui(g(σ(t)); t) ≥ ui(g(σ′i(ti), σ−i(t−i)); t),
where t = (ti, t−i). Let NEΓ(T ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of the game Γ(T ).
I now deﬁne Nash implementation.
Deﬁnition 13 An SCS F is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism
Γ such that g ◦NEΓ(T ) ≈ F . More speciﬁcally, this requirement can be decomposed
into the following two properties: (1) for any SCF f ∈ F , there exists σ ∈ NEΓ(T )
such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ NEΓ(T ), there exists fˆ ∈ F such that
g ◦ σ ≈ fˆ .
Remark: This deﬁnition is weaker than the one used by Maskin (1999). See the
remark after I provided the deﬁnition of interim implementaion.
In complete information environments, Maskin (1999) proposes a monotonic-
ity condition for Nash implementation when he considers mixed strategy Nash
implementation. This condition is often called Maskin monotonicity.
Deﬁnition 14 An SCS F satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity if, for any f ∈ F and
t, t
′ ∈ T ∗, whenever f(t′) /∈ F (t), there exist i ∈ N and α ∈ Δ(A) such that
ui(α; t) > ui(f(t
′
); t) and ui(f(t
′
); t
′
) ≥ ui(α; t′).
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The result below shows an equivalence between single-valued interim equilib-
rium monotonicity and Maskin monotonicity in complete information environments
where interim incentive compatibility is satisﬁed.
Proposition 6 Suppose that (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i )i∈N is a complete information type space
in (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N and an SCS F satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility. Then,
F satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisﬁes single-valued interim
equilibrium monotonicity.
Proof : (⇐) Suppose that F satisﬁes single-valued interim equilibrium mono-
tonicity. Fix f ∈ F . Assume that there exist t, t′ ∈ T ∗ such that f(t′) ∈ F (t).
Deﬁne β as a single-valued deception with the following property: for any i ∈ N
and t˜i ∈ Ti,
βi(t˜i) =
{
t
′
i if t˜i = ti
t˜i otherwise.
By construction of β above and single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity of
F , we have the following: there exist i ∈ N, ti ∈ T ∗i , and T−i-measurable function
y∗ : T−i → Δ(A) such that
Ui(y
∗ ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti),
where for all t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
Deﬁne α = y∗(β−i(t−i)) = y∗(t
′
−i) ∈ Δ(A). Note that f(β(t)) = f(t′). Since we
focus on a complete information environment, by single-valued interim equilibrium
monotonicity, we obtain the following:
ui(α; t) > ui(f(t
′
); t) and ui(f(t
′
); t
′
) ≥ ui(α; t′).
Thus, F also satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity.
(⇒) Suppose that F satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity. Fix f ∈ F and β as a
single-valued deception such that f ◦β /∈ F . Since we assume that f ◦β /∈ F , there
must exist t, t
′ ∈ T ∗ such that f(t′) /∈ F (t) and t′ = β(t). Fix such t and t′. Since
F satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity, there exist i ∈ N and α ∈ Δ(A) such that
ui(α; t) > ui(f(t
′
); t) and ui(f(t
′
); t
′
) ≥ ui(α; t′).
Deﬁne y∗ : T−i → Δ(A) as follows: for any t˜−i,
y∗(t˜−i) =
{
α if t˜−i = t
′
−i
f(t
′
i, t˜−i) otherwise.
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Since we focus on a complete information environment, by construction of y∗ and
Maskin monotonicity of F , we have
Ui(y
∗ ◦ β−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β|ti).
Since F satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility and we focus on a complete in-
formation environment, by construction of y∗ and Maskin monotonicity of F , we
have the following: for any t˜i ∈ T ∗i ,
Ui(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(y∗|t˜i).
Thus, F satisﬁes single-valued interim equilibrium monotonicity.
When a complete information type space is considered, I show that “every”
SCS satisﬁes the convex range property.
Lemma 2 Suppose (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i )i∈N is a complete information type space. Then,
every SCS F satisﬁes the convex range property.
Proof : Fix f ∈ F and a collection of “single-valued” deceptions {βλ}λ∈Λ such
that f ◦ βλ ∈ F for each λ ∈ Λ. Assume that there exists (not necessarily single-
valued) deception β˜ such that β˜(t) =
⋃
λ β
λ(t) for every t ∈ T ∗. Since every
t ∈ T ∗ is a belief-closed subspace under complete information, we can conclude
that f ◦ β˜(t) ∈ F (t) for every t ∈ T ∗, which implies f ◦ β˜ ∈ F .
The next result shows that under complete information where incentive com-
patibility is satisﬁed, there is an equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and
interim equilibrium monotonicity.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i )i∈N is a complete information type space
in (Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N and an SCS F satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility. Then, F
satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisﬁes interim equilibrium mono-
tonicity.
Proof : This follows from Proposition 6 and Lemma 2.
The next result shows that interim incentive compatibility becomes a vacuous
constraint in complete information environments where there are at least three
agents.
Proposition 7 Suppose that (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i )i∈N is a complete information type space
and there are at least three agents, i.e., n ≥ 3. Then, for every SCS F , there exists
an SCS Fˆ ≈ F such that Fˆ satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility.
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Proof : Fix f ∈ F . We claim that there exists an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ
satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility. Since we consider a complete information
type space, the following fact is commonly certain among all the agents: there exists
a collection of {ϕi}i∈N with ϕi : T ∗i → T ∗−i such that for each t ∈ T ∗, i, j ∈ N , we
have (ti, ϕi(ti)) = (tj, φj(tj)) = t where ti and tj are the i-th and j-th component
of t, respectively. Deﬁne an SCF fˆ as follows: for any t ∈ T ,
fˆ(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
f(t) if ∃J ⊆ N with |J | ≥ n− 1
s.t. (ti, ϕi(ti)) = (tj , ϕj(tj)) = t for all i, j ∈ J
b otherwise,
where b is an arbitrarily element of Δ(A). By construction of fˆ , any “unilateral”
deviation from the truth telling causes no real consequences. So, we have that for
any i ∈ N and ti, t′i ∈ Ti,
Ui(fˆ |ti) = Ui(fˆ ; t′i|ti).
Thus, fˆ satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility. Once again, by construction of fˆ ,
we have fˆ ≈ f .
When a complete information type space is considered, I only need a much
weaker version of NWR:
Deﬁnition 15 An SCS F satisﬁes the no-worst-alternative condition (hence-
forth, NWA) if, for each f ∈ F and i ∈ N , there exists an SCF yi[f ] : T → Δ(A)
such that
ui(f(t); t) > ui(yi[f ](t); t)
for all t ∈ T ∗.
Remark: This is what Cabrales and Serrano (2011) proposed as “the no-worst-
alternative” condition. In words, NWA says that the SCS never assign the worst
outcome to any agent at any state.
In order to obtain a suﬃciency result for Nash implementation, Maskin (1999),
among many others, uses the following condition: an SCS F satisﬁes the no-veto-
power condition if, for any t ∈ T , whenever there exist a set of agents J ⊆ N with
|J | ≥ n− 1 and a lottery α ∈ Δ(A) such that uj(α; t) ≥ uj(b; t) for any b ∈ Δ(A)
and j ∈ J , then α ∈ F (t). Note that Maskin (1999) already showed that the
no-veto-power condition is “not” necessary for Nash implementation.
When I restrict my attention to complete information type spaces, I obtain the
following suﬃciency result for Nash implementation:
38
Theorem 4 Suppose that (T ∗i ,T
∗
i , π
∗
i )i∈N is a complete information type space in
(Ti,Ti, πi)i∈N and there are at least three agents, i.e., n ≥ 3. If an SCS F satisﬁes
Maskin monotonicity and NWA, there exists an SCS Fˆ ≈ F such that Fˆ is Nash
implementable.
Remark: I argue that NWA is a very mild requirement because it only requires
that a given SCS never assign the worst outcome to anyone at any state. With
this qualiﬁcation in mind, this result is an improvement over all existing results on
mixed strategy Nash implementation.
Proof : Recall the deﬁnition of Yi[f ]:
Yi[f ] ≡
{
yi : T−i → Δ(A)
∣∣∣∣ yi is T−i-measurable andUi(f |t˜i) ≥ Ui(yi|t˜i) ∀t˜i ∈ T ∗i
}
.
The set Yi[f ] is associated with its Borel σ-algebra Yi[f ]. By NWA, Yi[f ] is
always nonempty. We prove this by constructing an implementing mechanism
Γ = (M,M , g). Each agent i sends a message mi = (m1i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i , m
5
i ) where
m1i ∈ T ∗i , m2i ∈ F, m3i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .}, m4i = {m4i [f ]}f∈F where m4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ]
for each f ∈ F , and m5i ∈ Δ(A). Let Mi = Ti ×F × 2 ×
∏
f∈F Yi[f ]× 2A be its
associated σ-algebra.
Since T is a Polish space, so is Δ(T ). Thus, Δ(T ) has a countable dense subset
and we denote its countable dense subset by Δ∗(T ). Then, one can ﬁnd a mapping
π : T → Δ∗(T ) such that π(t) is the closest to t (in terms of the associated
topology on Δ(T )) for each t ∈ T . For all t, t′ ∈ T , we say that t and t′ are
equivalent (denoted t ∼ t′) if π(t) = π(t′). We then deﬁne T ∗ = T\ ∼ as the
equivalence class on T via ∼. By construction, T ∗ is a countable set and we denote
it by T ∗ = {t∗1, t∗2, . . . }. Consider an SCS F and ﬁx f ∈ F . Since F satisﬁes NWA,
we can deﬁne a uniform lottery y¯i[f ] as follows:
y¯i[f ] ≡ (1− δ)
2
∞∑
k=1
δk−1 {f(t∗k) + yi[f ](t∗k)}
for some δ ∈ (0, 1). We ﬁx some f ∈ F and deﬁne another uniform lottery α¯ as
follows:
α¯ ≡ (1− δ)
2n
∑
i∈N
∞∑
k=1
δk−1 {f(t∗k) + yi[f ](t∗k)} .
These {{y¯i[f ]}f∈F}i∈N and α¯ will be used in the canonical mechanism.
The outcome g(m) is determined by the following rules:
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Rule i: If there exists f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all j ∈ N , then
g(m) = f(m1).
Rule ii: If there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all
j = i and m3i > 1, then
g(m) =
{
m4i [f ](m
1
−i) with probabiltiy m
3
i /(m
3
i + 1)
y¯i[f ] with probability 1/(m
3
i + 1)
where y¯i[f ] is the uniform lottery over A we deﬁned previously using NWA.
Rule iii: In all other cases,
g(m) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m51 with probability m
3
1/n(m
3
1 + 1)
m52 with probability m
3
2/n(m
3
2 + 1)
...
...
m5n with probability m
3
n/n(m
3
n + 1)
α¯ with the remaining probability
where α¯ is the uniform lottery over A we deﬁned previously using NWA. Note
that closure becomes vacuous under a complete information type space. When
there are at least three agents, by Proposition 7, we can ﬁnd an SCS Fˆ ≈ F such
that Fˆ satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility. In what follows, we focus on the
SCS Fˆ and will prove that Fˆ is Nash implementable by the canonical mechanism
proposed above. After we observe that any interim equilibrium reduces to a Nash
equilibrium under complete information, the proof of the theorem is essentially the
same as that of Theorem 1 but the main diﬀerences from Theorem 1 is that one
can weaken NWR and interim equilibrium monotonicity into NWA and Maskin
monotonicity, respectively.
The proof consists of a series of claims.
Claim i: For any Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ(T ), m ∈ M , and t ∈ T ∗:
m ∈ supp(σ(·|t))⇒ m3j = 1 for each j = i.
Proof of Claim i: Since we consider a complete information type space, the
following fact is commonly certain among all the agents: there exists a collection
of {ϕi}i∈N with ϕi : T ∗i → T ∗−i such that for each t ∈ T ∗, i, j ∈ N , we have
(ti, ϕi(ti)) = (tj, φj(tj)) = t.
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Fix a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ(T ). We focus on type ti of agent i who has
the following conjecture over M−i:
σ−i(·|ϕi(ti)) ∈ Δ(M−i).
Suppose by way of contradiction that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message mi such
that m3i > 1. We ﬁx such mi and partition the messages of all agents but i as
follows: for each T ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(T
′
−i) =
{
m−i| ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f and m3j = 1 for all j = i and m1−i ⊆ T
′
−i
}
,
and
Mˆ−i = {m−i| m3j > 1 for some j = i}.
If ∫
Mˆ−i
σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, since F satisﬁes NWA, we know that there exists mˆ5i ∈ Δ(A) such that
ui(mˆ
5
i ; ti, ϕi(ti)) > ui(α¯; ti, ϕi(ti)).
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
5
i is replaced by mˆ
5
i deﬁned above
and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); ti, φi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) >
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, φi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ NEΓ(T ).
For each T ′−i ∈ T−i, if ∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)),
then, we can set
ψi(T ′−i) ≡ γ
∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti))
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for any T ′−i ∈ T−i where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
T−i
ψi(dt
′
−i) = 1. Since
F satisﬁes NWA, there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∫
T−i
ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t
′
−i); ti, ϕi(ti))ψ(dt
′
−i) > ui(y¯i[f ]; ti, t−i).
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
4
i [f ] is replaced by mˆ
4
i [f ] deﬁned
above and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the
following:∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); ti, φi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) >
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, φi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ NEΓ(T ).
Claim ii: For any Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ(T ), there exists f ∈ Fˆ such that
m2j = f for each j ∈ N, tj ∈ T ∗j , and mj ∈ supp (σj(·|tj)).
Proof of Claim ii: Fix a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ(T ). By the previous
claim, for any j ∈ N, tj ∈ Tj , and mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)), we have m3j = 1. Suppose
on the contrary that there exists t ∈ T ∗ such that supp(σi(·|ti)) contains a message
mi such that m
2
i ≈ m2k for some k = i. Then, we ﬁx such mi and only need to
consider the following two cases: either
Case 1: there exist i, j, k ∈ N such that m2i ≈ m2j , m2j ≈ m2k, and m2k ≈ m2i ; or
Case 2: there exist i ∈ N and f ∈ F such that m2j ≈ f for all j = i.
We ﬁrst assume that Case 1 applies and focus on agent i of type ti who has the
following conjecture over M−i:
σ−i(·|ϕi(ti)) ∈ Δ(M−i).
We consider the following messages of all agents but i:
Mˆ−i =
{
m−i| ∃j, k ∈ N\{i} s.t. m2i ≈ m2j , m2j ≈ m2k, and m2k ≈ m2i
}
.
If ∫
Mˆ−i
σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, since F satisﬁes NWA, there exists mˆ5i ∈ Δ(A) such that
ui(mˆ
5
i ; ti, ϕi(ti)) > ui(α¯; ti, ϕi(ti)).
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Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
5
i is replaced by mˆ
5
i deﬁned above
and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality allows us to conclude the following:∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); ti, ϕi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) >
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, ϕi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ NEΓ(T ).
We next assume that Case 2 applies and focus on agent i of type ti who has
the following conjecture over M−i:
σ−i(·|ϕi(ti)) ∈ Δ(M−i).
We consider the following messages of all agents but i: for each T ′−i ∈ T−i,
M∗−i(T
′
−i) =
{
m−i| ∃f ∈ F s.t. m2j ≈ f ∀j = i and m1−i ⊆ T ′−i
}
.
For each T ′−i ∈ T−i, if ∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) > 0,
then, we can set
ψi(T ′−i) ≡ γ
∫
M∗−i(T
′
−i)
σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti))
where the constant γ is chosen so that
∫
T−i
ψi(dt
′
−i) = 1. Since F satisﬁes NWA,
there exists mˆ4i [f ] ∈ Yi[f ] such that∫
T−i
ui(mˆ
4
i [f ](t
′
−i); ti, ϕi(ti))ψi(dt
′
−i) > ui(y¯i[f ]; ti, t−i).
Deﬁne mˆi to be the same as mi except that m
4
i [f ] is replaced by mˆ
4
i [f ] deﬁned
above and mˆ3i = m
3
i + 1. Then, the above inequality concludes the following:∫
M−i
ui(g(mˆi, m−i); ti, ϕi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)) >
∫
M−i
ui(g(mi, m−i); ti, ϕi(ti))σ−i(dm−i|ϕi(ti)).
Thus, mˆi would be an even better response to σ−i than mi. This contradicts to
our hypothesis that σ ∈ NEΓ(T ).
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Claim iii: For each f ∈ Fˆ , there exists a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ(T ) such that
for all j ∈ N and tj ∈ Ti:
mj ∈ supp(σj(·|tj)) ⇒ mj = (tj , f, 1, m4j , m5j)
for some m4j ∈ M4j and m5j ∈ M5j .
Proof of Claim iii: Fix f ∈ F . For each j ∈ N , deﬁne σj : Tj → Mj satisfying
the following properties: for each tj ∈ T ∗j ,
1. σ1j (tj) = tj ∈ M1j ;
2. σ2j (tj) = f ∈ M2j ; and
3. σ3j (tj) = 1 ∈ M3j .
Fix i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti. It only remains to show that σi(ti) is a best response to σ−i.
Observe that m2i , m
5
i or both are irrelevant for the resulting outcome given σ−i. If
type ti deviates from σi(ti) to some mˆi where mˆ
3
i > 1, he can induce Rule ii. Then,
there is always positive probability that y¯i[f ] is chosen and since F satisﬁes NWA,
type ti will be worse oﬀ than playing σi(ti). Thus, the only proﬁtable deviation type
ti can possibly have is to change m
1
i but keep m
3
i = 1. However, since all agents
are truthful by our hypothesis and f satisﬁes interim incentive compatibility, this
cannot be proﬁtable. Therefore, σi(ti) is a best response of ti to σ−i.
Claim iv: For each SCF f ∈ Fˆ and deception β, if there exists a Nash
equilibrium σ ∈ NEΓ(T ) such that for each t ∈ T ∗, m ∈ supp (σ(·|t)), and j ∈ N ,
mj = (t
′
j , f, 1, m
4
j , m
5
j) for some (m
4
i , m
5
i ) and t
′
j ∈ βj(tj),
then, f ◦ β ∈ Fˆ .
Proof of Claim iv: Note that the convex range property becomes a vacuous
constraint under a complete information type space. By Propositions 3 and 6, we
know that Fˆ satisﬁes interim equilibrium monotonicity. Therefore, this is the same
as the proof of Claim 4 of Theorem 1.
All four claims we have established above imply that (1) for any f ∈ Fˆ , there
exists σ ∈ NEΓ(T ) such that g ◦ σ ≈ f ; and (2) for any σ ∈ NEΓ(T ), we have that
g ◦ σ ∈ Fˆ . Thus, we complete the proof of the theorem.
As a corollary, Proposition 2 of Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011) also
establishes a similar result but need one extra condition called responsiveness and
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only focus their analysis on social choice “functions.” An SCF f is said to be
responsive if, for each t, t
′ ∈ T ∗, whenever t = t′, f(t) = f(t′). Note that this re-
sponsiveness can be very restrictive if the underlying type space is an uncountable
one. On the contrary, the above result can completely dispense with this respon-
siveness condition and it holds for the case of social choice “correspondences.” The
reader is referred to Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011) for more details of
the argument.
10 Conclusion
The current paper proposes the concept of interim equilibrium implementation
and identiﬁes arguably the weakest set of conditions for interim equilibrium imple-
mentation. I also cover the case of two agents, social choice functions, and Nash
implementation under complete information. The main contribution of this paper
is to propose a uniﬁcation of the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation
and Nash implementation.
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